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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David Basil Mercer appeals from the district court’s Judgment summarily
dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On appeal, Mr. Mercer contends that
the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition in its entirety because, with
regard to the double jeopardy assertion, the district court erroneously believed that it
had already dismissed that claim.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
David Basil Mercer was convicted of felony DUI on October 30, 2008. (R., p.36.)
He was sentenced to serve ten years, with five years fixed, but the district court retained
jurisdiction, and placed Mr. Mercer on probation after the rider. (R., p.5.) Mr. Mercer
did not appeal from the initial conviction. (R., p.36.) After Mr. Mercer violated his
probation, the district court revoked his probation on June 3, 2013. (R., p.36.) He
appealed from the order revoking his probation and the order denying his I.C.R. 35
motion, but the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence in docket number 41068.
(State v. Mercer, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 393 (Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2014); R., pp.56, 36.)
Mr. Mercer filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on October 30, 2014.
(R., pp.5-15.) He claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective at the sentencing hearing
and at his probation violation disposition hearing for failing to return his phone calls,
failing to negotiate with the prosecutor, failing to obtain a copy of the PSI until the day of
sentencing, and failing to get the new PSI to the judge prior to the date of the probation
violation disposition hearing. He further asserted that his plea was not knowing or
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voluntary because his trial counsel and the prosecutor threatened him with filing a
persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.6-7, 9-10.) He also alleged that his
sentence was disproportionate to the offense and the district court abused its
sentencing discretion. (R., pp.6-7.) He alleged that he was subject to double jeopardy
because he served 30 days discretionary for a new misdemeanor crime and then a
probation violation was filed in which the State alleged he violated his probation by
being charged with the same new crime. (R., pp.7-8.) He further alleged that his
counsel on the Rule 35 motion was ineffective for not bringing it to the district court’s
attention that he was expecting his first child, and that he was erroneously imprisoned
on a misdemeanor case number. (R., p.8.) He claimed that when he (petitioner) spoke
up to tell the court about the driver’s license suspension, the court ruled in petitioner’s
favor thus, if trial counsel had spoken up to defend petitioner, the petitioner’s sentence
would have been different. (R., pp.10-11.)
The district court filed a notice of its intent to dismiss three claims relating to the
underlying conviction—that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because
of threats made by the State regarding the persistent violator enhancement and to
claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel at the original sentencing—as they
were not timely filed from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.23.) The district court also
noticed that it intended to dismiss the claim that the judge was reassigned and that the
judge did not conduct a hearing on the Rule 35 motion as these are not bases for relief
under the UPCPA. (R., pp.23-24.) The district court noticed its intent to dismiss the
claims of disproportionate sentence, the abuse of discretion by the judge at the
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probation violation hearing, and abuse of discretion in disregarding the recommendation
in the PSI because these claims were already litigated on direct appeal. (R., pp.24-25.)
In a subsequent order entered the same day, the district court found that the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the probation violation proceedings and the
double jeopardy claim may be the basis for a valid claim. (R., pp.28-29.) The district
court appointed counsel on these two claims. (R., p.29.)
Mr. Mercer did not respond to the court’s notice, and those claims were
dismissed. (R., pp.35-41.) Petitioner’s counsel filed a supplemental affidavit which
provided additional details of the initial post-conviction claims. (R., pp.57-60.) The
State moved for summary dismissal. (R., pp.70-71, 76-84.) The district court held a
hearing on the State’s motion for summary dismissal; Mr. Mercer participated
telephonically.

(6/25/15 Tr.)

Afterward, the district court entered a written Order

Granting Summary Dismissal. (R., pp.146-158.) The district court dismissed all of the
petitioner’s claims except the claim that the petitioner was in prison on a misdemeanor
case number. (R., pp.146-158.)
In its written decision granting summary dismissal, the district court found
summary dismissal was appropriate because: (1) the petitioner did not establish his
Rule 35 counsel was ineffective for failing to point out mitigating factors including that
petitioner was expecting his first child because this is incorrect where that information
was put before the court, along with nine letters in support; (2) the petitioner did not
establish his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide the court with the updated
PSI report until the actual probation violation disposition hearing because the court had
the opportunity to review the document prior to sentencing and petitioner did not provide
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facts or allegations to support his claim that the sentence would have been different had
the court received the copy earlier; (3) the petitioner did not establish his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing ask for an extension of time for the court to review the updated
PSI report because the court had the opportunity to review the document prior to
sentencing and petitioner did not provide facts or allegations to support his claim that
the sentence would have been different had the court received the copy earlier; (4) the
petitioner did not establish his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to bring to the
court’s attention all of the positive things petitioner accomplished while on probation
because trial counsel did address positive issues at the hearing, and, while counsel did
not raise the entirety of it, such does not make his performance deficient. (R., pp.153158.) The district court also noted that it had already dismissed the double jeopardy
issue, and although it was raised again in Mr. Mercer’s supplemental affidavit, such
does not serve to reinstate an issue that had already been dismissed. (R., pp.151-152.)
The court also noted that the claim that Mr. Mercer was in prison on a misdemeanor
case number was still live. (R., p.151.)
On August 17, 2015, the final claim was dismissed and the district court entered
a final judgment. (R., pp.159-163.) The district court dismissed the claim that the
petitioner erroneously was in prison on a misdemeanor case number, finding that the
case number does not change the nature of the charges set forth in the Information or
the defendant’s pleas or conviction and thus provides no basis for relief. (R., p.160.)
Mr. Mercer filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment
summarily dismissing his Petition. (R., pp.166-170.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Mercer’s Petition for PostConviction Relief because it erroneously believed that it had already dismissed the
double jeopardy claim?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Mercer’s Petition For PostConviction Relief Because It Erroneously Believed That It Had Already Dismissed The
Double Jeopardy Claim
A.

Introduction
Mr. Mercer alleged that he was subject to double jeopardy because he served

thirty (30) days of discretionary time for his new charge of resisting and obstructing and
then the same resisting and obstructing charge was used as the basis for a probation
violation and which resulted in the district court revoking probation. Following the notice
of intent to dismiss, the court appointed counsel on this claim. (R., pp.28-29.) The
district court erred when it found it had already dismissed the double jeopardy claim.
B.

Post-Conviction Jurisprudence
In an appeal from post-conviction proceedings, the appellate court will exercise

free review of the district court’s application of the relevant law to the facts. Nellsch v.
State, 122 Idaho 426, 434 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). The review of “a district
court’s construction and application of a statute, the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act (UPCPA), is a matter of free review.” Evensioski v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190
(2001) (citations omitted).
A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from the underlying
criminal action which led to the petitioner’s conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,
456 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post- Conviction Procedure
Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to 4911), and the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter, I.R.C.P.).

Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456.
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Because it is a civil

proceeding, the petitioner must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the
evidence. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). However, the petition
initiating post-conviction proceeding differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. A
post-conviction petition is required to include more than “a short and plain statement of
the claim”; it “must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached.”
Id.; I.C. § 19-4903.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through
post-conviction proceedings. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25 (Ct. App. 1992).
To prevail on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show that
trial

counsel’s

performance

was

constitutionally

deficient—that

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

the

attorney’s

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).
After a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.” Strickland, at 694; Aragon, at 760.
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I.C. § 19-4906(c).1

In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the

Although this standard is set forth in section 19-4906(b), which deals with motions for
summary disposition, it appears to apply to sua sponte dismissals as well. See, e.g.,
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998) (discussing the standard for

1
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district court need not “accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.” Martinez v.
State, 126 Idaho 813, 816-17 (Ct. App. 1995). Additionally, the district court need not
accept those of the petitioner’s allegations which are “clearly disproved by the record.”
Coontz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368 (Ct. App. 1996).

However, if the petitioner

presents some shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must
take the petitioner’s allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted
by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968) (holding that the State’s motion
to dismiss was unsupported by any affidavits or depositions, and therefore did not
“controvert” the facts alleged in the petitioner’s application). This is so even if the
allegations appear incredible on their face. Id. The district court is required to accept
the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but is not required to accept the
petitioner’s conclusion. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903.
Neither the United States Constitution nor the Idaho Constitution afford a postconviction petitioner a right to counsel. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987);
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389 (2014).

The Idaho Legislature has afforded post-

conviction petitioners the ability to request counsel to assist “the applicant in the
preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal . . .“ I.C. § 19-4904. The
decision to appoint counsel is discretionary on the part of the district court; however, the
court’s discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily. “[T]he proper standard for determining
whether to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is

summary disposition under section 19-4906 generally as being whether a genuine issue
of material fact has been presented).
8

whether the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim.” Swader v.
State, 143 Idaho 651, 653 (2007).
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Id. If there is no question of fact, and if the
State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissal can be ordered either sua
sponte or pursuant to the State’s motion. I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). If the district court
decides to sua sponte dismiss the application, I.C. § 19-4906(b) requires the court to
notify the parties of its intention and its reasons for so doing. The court must give the
petitioner twenty (20) days to respond. I.C. § 19-4906(b); Saykhamchone v. State, 127
Idaho 319, 321 (1995). Failure to provide the requisite notice prior to dismissal requires
reversal

of

a

judgment

denying

the

application

for

post-conviction

relief.

Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 321.
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never involve the
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations
of law. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court’s summary dismissal
order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006).
C.

The District Court Erred In Finding That It Had Already Summarily Dismissed The
Double Jeopardy Claim Set Forth In Mr. Mercer’s Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief
The district court erred in summarily dismissing the Petition in its entirety where it

had failed to analyze the double jeopardy claim because it believed the claim had
already been dismissed.
The district court filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss on November 21, 2014.
(R., pp.21-26.) In the Notice, the district court noted that it intended to dismiss the
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claims of disproportionate sentence, the abuse of discretion by the judge at the
probation violation hearing, and abuse of discretion in disregarding the recommendation
in the PSI, because these claims were already litigated on direct appeal.2 (R., pp.2126) While the district court mentioned the double jeopardy claim in its Notice, the court
failed to make clear whether it intended to dismiss the claim as the conclusion of the
Notice omits this claim.

(R., pp.24-25.)

To the extent the Notice is unclear, in a

subsequent order also entered on November 21, 2014, the district court appointed
counsel on the double jeopardy claim. (R., pp.28-30.)
The district court found:
However, the court finds that part of paragraph 7.a. that alleges
ineffective assistance of counsel during the probation violation
proceedings or that the revocation of probation was a violation of
double jeopardy because he had done discretionary time and then
had his probation revoked for the same conduct may be the basis of
a valid claim and counsel should be appointed to assist in framing a
valid claim on these allegations only.
(R., pp.28-29) (emphasis in original). The district court specified, “[t]his appointment of
counsel is only for the allegations outlined above which have not been summarily
dismissed.” (R., p.29) (emphasis added).
Mr. Mercer did not respond within the 20 day time period. On December 19,
2014, the district court entered an order dismissing the claims addressed in the Notice.
(R., pp.35-41.) While the district court again mentioned the double jeopardy claim in its
December 19, 2014 order partially dismissing some of the claims, the court again failed
to make clear whether it was dismissing the claim and, if so, on what grounds.

The district court identified a litany of claims as falling under 7.c., most likely because
the petition contained an “Appendix A” that followed section 7(c) of the petition.
(R., pp.6-8.)

2
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(R., pp.39-40,

45.)

The

district

court specifically dismissed

the

claims of

disproportionate sentence, the abuse of discretion by the judge at the probation
violation hearing, and abuse of discretion in disregarding the recommendation in the
PSI, because these claims were already litigated on direct appeal. (R., pp.39-40.) The
district court used the same language it used in the Notice, which did not specify
whether the double jeopardy claim was dismissed. (R., pp.24-25.)
On March 31, 2015, Mr. Mercer’s counsel filed a supplemental affidavit which
provided additional details of the initial post-conviction claims, including some
elaboration/modification of his double jeopardy claim to read:
Additionally, [trial counsel] did not file a Motion to Dismiss the allegation in
the Motion for Probation Violation that alleged the new charge of Resisting
and Obstructing Officers. I had previously been ordered discretionary jail
time as a result of that new charge. I believe the court imposed my
sentence primarily relying on the new charge for which I had already been
punished.
(R., pp.57-60.) The State moved for summary dismissal. (R., pp.70-71, 76-84.) A
hearing was held. (6/25/15 Tr.) Notably, in its supporting memorandum, the State
addressed the issue of the double jeopardy claim. (R., pp.82-83.) The district court
entered a written Order Granting Summary Dismissal. (R., pp.146-158.) When the
district court analyzed the remaining claims, it found it had already dismissed the double
jeopardy claim and declined to address it further. (R., pp.151-152.) This was error
because the district court appointed counsel on the claim after the notice of intent to
dismiss. (R., pp.78-79.) To the extent that the notice of intent to dismiss is unclear, the
district court’s subsequent order appointing counsel made it clear that this claim was not
a subject of the notice.
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The district court can only sua sponte dismiss for the reasons set forth in the
Notice. See I.C. § 19-4906(b); Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 321. Because the court
erroneously believed that it had dismissed the double jeopardy claim, the court erred.
Because this is the only ground for dismissing the double jeopardy claim, this case must
be remanded for consideration of the claim.
In sum, the district court erred in summarily dismissing without analyzing the
claim that Mr. Mercer was subjected to double jeopardy for the discretionary time
followed by a probation violation.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Mercer respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, vacate the judgment, and
remand the case for consideration of the double jeopardy claim.
DATED this 10th day of March, 2016.

___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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